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Walsh: Why States Should Challenge 15 U.S.C. § 381

MURPHY V. NCAA: WHY STATES IN NEED OF REVENUE
SHOULD CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 15 U.S.C.
§ 381
Owen Walsh

I. INTRODUCTION
Taxes—individuals and businesses will inevitably owe them. Although
it is certain the businesses will have tax liabilities, questions remain
regarding to what extent state governments can tax individual or business.
In 1959, Congress partially answered this question and prohibited a state
from collecting net income tax from out-of-state businesses whose only
income derived from the state was from solicitating orders sent and filled
outside the state.1 In a modern economy, where millions of online orders
are placed each day, this restriction on net income taxes can heavily
reduce states’ tax revenue. While many experts agree that South Dakota
v. Wayfair2 is a revolutionary case when it comes to jurisprudence
concerning taxation of out-of-state businesses, states looking to levy net
income taxes on out-of-state businesses may have a second bite at the
apple thanks to a different source: the sports betting case of Murphy v.
NCAA.3
Murphy v. NCAA involved New Jersey’s attempt to legalize sports
gambling. The Supreme Court decided in favor of New Jersey,
invalidating a portion of a Congressional act, using the anticommandeering principle of the United States Constitution. Expanding
the anti-commandeering principle,4 the Court held that it did not matter
whether Congress forced a state to take “affirmative action” or simply
prohibited an action, Congress cannot issue direct orders to state
legislatures in either event.5
This Article seeks to encourage states, especially those in desperate
need of tax revenue, to challenge the Interstate Income Act of 19596
(codified as “15 U.S.C. § 381”) on the ground that it violates the anticommandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment. Much like the
1. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1959).
2. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
3. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
4. For further discussion of the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine, see Part II.
5. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
6. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 72 Stat. 555 (restricting states from imposing a net
income tax on income derived within their borders by foreign businesses if the only business activity of
the company within the state consists of the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property,
which orders are to be sent outside the state and are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside
the state).
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Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) prohibited
New Jersey from repealing existing sports gambling laws, 15 U.S.C. §
381 prohibits states from levying net income taxes on businesses that
merely solicit orders within a state but fill and ship said orders from
outside the state. On the same grounds that PASPA was held
unconstitutional, 15 U.S.C. § 381 could also be held unconstitutional. Part
I of this Article discusses the constitutional and congressional limitations
on state taxing authority. Part II goes on to discuss the anticommandeering doctrine. Part III highlights the main argument of this
Article: that states in need of tax revenue should challenge the
constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 381 as it violates the Tenth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
As of September 2013, there were 90,106 governmental units in the
United States, excluding the Federal Government.7 Not all of these
governmental units have the power to tax, but a number of them can. A
question remains: under what circumstances may these governmental
units tax individuals and businesses? The first section of this Part inquires
into the jurisdictional question of state and local tax by analyzing
constitutional limitations on state taxing authority, the Due Process
Clause and Commerce Clause, and also looks at the congressional
limitations on tax jurisdiction by analyzing 15 U.S.C. § 381.
The second half of this Part delves into the anti-commandeering
doctrine and the impact that it may have on 15 U.S.C. § 381. Until Murphy
in 2018, there were two principal cases that analyzed the anticommandeering doctrine: New York v. United States8 and Printz v. United
States.9 Murphy expanded on the rulings in New York and Printz by
analyzing whether a congressional statute regulates private actors or the
state. It is under the anti-commandeering doctrine enunciated in these
three cases that a state could challenge the constitutionality of 15 U.S.C.
§ 381.
A. State Taxing Authority
In order for a state to be able to tax an individual or entity, there first
must be jurisdiction to tax the individual or entity. At a minimum, in order
to have the jurisdiction to tax an individual or entity, the state must meet
the constitutional limitations within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
7. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 23
(10th ed. 2014).
8. 505 U.S. 144, 150 (1992).
9. 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
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Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. In addition to constitutional
limitations on tax jurisdiction, Congress also has the power to impose
limitations on states’ jurisdiction to tax. Part A of section I examines these
constitutional limitations, highlighting the major cases under the Due
Process Clause and Commerce Clause. Part B then looks at the federal
limitations on states’ jurisdiction to tax by analyzing 15 U.S.C. § 381,
case law interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 381, and a Multistate Tax Commission
memorandum clarifying the case law interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 381.
1. Constitutional Limits on State Taxing Authority
The threshold question every time a state or local government imposes
a tax on an individual or entity is whether the state or local government
imposing the tax has the jurisdiction to do so?10 This inquiry includes an
analysis of two constitutional provisions: the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8
Clause 3.11
a. Due Process Clause
When applied to any area of the law, the Due Process Clause’s primary
consideration is fairness.12 The landmark case International Shoe v.
Washington questioned whether an individual had “sufficient minimum
contacts” with a state in which jurisdiction “will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”13 Similarly, the Due Process
Clause as interpreted in tax needs “some definite link, some minimum
connection between a state and the person, property, or transaction it
seeks to tax.”14
Traditionally, for a state to tax an individual or entity, that individual
or entity needed to have “physical presence” within the state.15 The
traditional rule of “physical presence,” however, was eliminated from the
Due Process Clause analysis in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.16 There,
Quill Corporation (“Quill”), a Delaware corporation, maintained offices
and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia.17 It did not have any
employees or property in North Dakota and only solicited business

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Miller Bros Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
Id.
Id. at 302.
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through catalogs, flyers, advertisements, and phone calls.18 With annual
sales of approximately $1,000,000 generated within the state, North
Dakota attempted to impose its use tax on Quill’s property within the
state.19
The Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause both require an inquiry
into “substantial nexus.”20 For the first time, however, the Court in Quill
bifurcated these analyses. Despite holding that Quill did not have
sufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause, the Court did overrule a
former case in deciding that the Due Process Clause does not require
physical presence: “[t]he Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link,
some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax,’ and that the ‘income attributed to the State for
tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing
State.’”21
The Court noted that physical presence within a state clearly
establishes jurisdiction to tax under the Due Process Clause, but
abandoned the more formalistic test that requires physical presence.22 The
Court instead favored a more flexible inquiry looking at whether a
defendant’s contacts within the State make it reasonable for them to be
subject to suit there: “[a]pplying these principles, we have held that if a
… corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic
market in the forum State, it may subject itself to the State's in personam
jurisdiction even if it has no physical presence in the State.”23 The Court
used this reasoning and justified the imposition of the collection duty on
a mail-order that was delivered in the state, whether the selling business
was physical present in the state or not.24 The Court concluded that “…
there is no question that Quill has purposefully directed its activities at
North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than
sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the
benefits Quill receives from access to the State.”25
b. Commerce Clause
The second constitutional provision limiting a state’s taxing authority
is the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause states that: “Congress

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 307.
Id. at 308.
Id.
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shall have the power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”26 In 1824, Chief
Justice John Marshall expanded this definition and read the Commerce
Clause as having a negative implication as well.27 The Dormant
Commerce Clause (also referred to as the Negative Commerce Clause) is
the principle that state legislation may not discriminate against interstate
commerce.28 The Negative Commerce Clause “became central to our
whole constitutional scheme: the doctrine that the commerce clause by its
own force and without national legislation, puts it into the power of the
Court to place limits upon state authority.”29
To analyze whether a state tax discriminates against interstate
commerce, the Court created a four-part test in Complete Auto v. Brady.30
The Complete Auto test states that in order for a state tax to be
constitutional under the Commerce Clause: (1) the tax must be applied to
an activity with substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the tax must
be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discriminate against foreign
commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly related to services provided by
the taxing state. This Article principally focuses on the first prong of the
Complete Auto test.31
Notably, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause both
contain a substantial nexus inquiry. Quill was the first time the Court
bifurcated the “substantial nexus” analyses under the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause: “[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.
The two standards are animated by different constitutional concerns and
policies.”32 The Court highlighted that Due Process concerns fairness of
governmental activity33 while the Commerce Clause nexus requirement
concerns the effects of state regulation on the national economy.34 The
Commerce Clause “prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce
and bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.”35
Despite holding that physical presence was not required under the Due
Process Clause, the Court in Quill reaffirmed that the substantial nexus
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824).
28. Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53
UCLA Law Review 153 (2005).
29. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 1819 (Quadrangle Paperback ed. 1964).
30. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
31. Id.
32. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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requirement of the Commerce Clause requires physical presence.36 The
Court concluded that a bright line physical presence standard “firmly
establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority.”37 Therefore,
despite soliciting business in North Dakota and having annual sales of
$1,000,000 in the state, the Court held that Quill did not have a requisite
nexus with North Dakota as it did not have a physical presence in the
state.38 This bright line physical presence standard, however, has been
subsequently chipped away since the decision in Quill in both income tax
and sales tax cases.39
i. Income Tax
In MBNA America Bank, the plaintiff-bank was an out-of-state
corporation with its principal place of business and commercial domicile
in Delaware.40 The bank had no real or tangible personal property and no
employees located in West Virginia.41 The bank promoted its business in
West Virginia via mail and telephone solicitation.42 West Virginia’s
Supreme Court of Appeals, after consideration of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s analysis in Quill, concluded that the physical-presence
requirement for showing a substantial Commerce Clause nexus applies
only to use and sales taxes and not to business franchise and corporation
net income taxes.43
Rather than applying the physical presence standard, the West Virginia
court used a significant economic presence test and believed that was a
better indicator of whether substantial nexus exists for Commerce Clause
purposes.44 The court adopted this test for three principal reasons. First,
the substantial economic presence standard “incorporates due process
‘purposeful direction’ towards a state while examining the degree to
which a company has exploited a local market.”45 Second, “[a] substantial
economic presence analysis involves an examination of both the quality
and quantity of the company's economic presence.” Lastly, under a
substantial economic presence analysis “[p]urposeful direction towards a
state is analyzed as it is for Due Process Clause purposes, and the
36. Id. at 318.
37. Id. at 315.
38. Id. at 314-17.
39. See Tax Comm'r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006); see also Geoffrey,
Inc. v. S.C. Tax Commn., 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993); South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
40. 640 S.E.2d 226, 226 (W. Va. 2006).
41. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A, 640 S.E.2d at 227.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id. at 234.
45. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Commerce Clause analysis requires the additional examination of the
frequency, quantity and systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic
contacts with a state.”46
Utilizing this new standard, the court concluded that the bank had a
substantial nexus with West Virginia such that the bank would be subject
to the tax.47 The court highlighted that the bank continuously and
systematically engaged in direct mail and telephone solicitation and
promotion in West Virginia.48 Moreover, the court noted that the bank
had $8,419,431.00 in gross receipts attributable to West Virginia
customers in 1998 and had $10,163,788.00 in 1999—large sales figures
that should be taxed by the state containing the market for the sales.49
In a similar case, South Carolina’s Supreme Court held that licensing
intangibles in South Carolina and deriving income from said licenses
creates a substantial nexus for Toys-R-Us.50 In Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, Geoffrey was a wholly-owned, second-tier
subsidiary of Toys-R-Us incorporated in Delaware with its principal
offices in Delaware.51 Geoffrey had no employees or offices in South
Carolina and owned no tangible property there.52 Geoffrey owned several
trademarks that it subsequently sold to Toys-R-Us.53 In return, Geoffrey
received a one percent royalty on the licensed materials.54 Toys-R-Us
began doing business in South Carolina in 1985 and had since then made
royalty payments to Geoffrey based on South Carolina sales which South
Carolina required Geoffrey to pay income tax on.55
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that “[i]t is well settled that
the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for
income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible property alone is
sufficient to establish nexus.”56 Moreover, a “taxpayer who is domiciled
in one state but carries on business in another is subject to taxation
measured by the value of the intangibles used in his business.”57
Therefore, Geoffrey was subject to the state’s income tax.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n., 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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ii. Sales Tax
The courts in MBNA and Geoffrey highlighted the distinction between
sales taxes and income taxes, allowing them to conclude that the Quill
physical presence standard did not apply to income taxation. The Supreme
Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair,58 however, confronted the 26-year-old
Quill doctrine and changed the physical presence standard for sales and
use taxes. In Wayfair, South Dakota faced a serious economic problem as
it lost between $48,000,000 and $58,000,000 per year due to its inability
to collect sales tax from non-South Dakota businesses.59 To remedy the
issue, the state enacted a statute whose purpose was “to provide for the
collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers.”60 The statute applied
only to sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of
goods or services into the State or engage in 200 or more separate
transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the state.61 Upon
enactment of the statute, South Dakota sought an injunction requiring
Wayfair, Inc, (and other companies running similar business models) to
register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax.62
The lower courts both held that the statute was unconstitutional under
the Quill rule.63 The Supreme Court of South Dakota, despite upholding
Quill, urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to analyze South
Dakota’s arguments.64 In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and overturned Quill. Listing three main reasons, the Supreme
Court claimed that “Quill is flawed on its own terms.”65
First, the Court stated that the physical presence test is not necessary
for “substantial nexus” under the Commerce Clause.66 The Court set aside
the principle from Quill that the burden on businesses in trying to comply
with state taxes where they are not principally located will cause an undue
burden on interstate commerce.67 The Court in Wayfair overruled this
interpretation, and stated that “administrative costs of compliance,
especially in the modern economy with its Internet technology, are largely
unrelated to whether a company happens to have a physical presence in a
state.”68
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
Id. at 2088.
Id.
Id. at 2089.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2092.
Id. at 2092-2093.
Id. at 2093
Id..
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Second, the Court pointed out that Quill created, rather than solved,
market distortions.69 Remote sellers have, in effect, been able to avoid the
regulatory burden of tax collection and could offer lower prices to
consumers than those business that had to pay those taxes: “[i]n effect,
Quill had come to serve as a judicially created tax shelter for business that
decided to limit their physical presence and still sold their goods and
services to a state’s consumers.”70
Lastly, the Court stated that Quill does not match with modern
precedents of the Commerce Clause.71 Quill took an extremely
formalistic view of the Commerce Clause when it held that physical
presence is a mandatory component of substantial nexus.72 In the Court’s
view, this did not make sense and imposed arbitrary burdens on in-state
sellers to the benefit of out-of-state sellers.73 In the end, the Wayfair Court
held that a taxpayer’s physical presence in a state was not necessary to
meet the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce Clause.74
2. Congressional Limits to State Taxing Authority
In addition to the constitutional limits imposed on state taxing
authority, Congress also has the power to impose limits on states’
jurisdiction to tax. 15 U.S.C. § 381, which was Congress’ response to
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, is a prime
example.75 In that case, an Iowa company had salespeople operating in an
office in Minnesota. The salespeople solicited sales in Minnesota.76 As a
whole, the company had extremely few sales in Minnesota.77 The
Supreme Court, however, upheld the Iowa company being subject to
Minnesota’s net income tax.78 Unhappy with a result where out-of-state
companies were subject to state income taxes solely by having sales
representatives in the state, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. § 381. This
statute denies states the power to impose taxes on net income derived
within the state if the “only business activities carried on within the State
are the solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property, where
the orders are sent outside the state for approval or rejection and are filled

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 2092.
Id. at 2094.
Id. at 2092.
Id at 2094.
Id..
Id. at 2099.
358 U.S. 450.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 469.
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by shipment or delivery from a point outside the state.”79
The provision states:
No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for
any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on the
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce
if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf of such
person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are
sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are
filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in
such State in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer
of such person, if orders by such customer to such person to enable
such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicitation are orders
described in paragraph (1).80

The principle case interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 381 is Wisconsin
Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.81 In that case,
Wrigley, an Illinois corporation, was subject to a franchise tax assessed
on a percentage of its income in Wisconsin.82 Wrigley objected to this
assessment by saying that its activities in Wisconsin were limited to
“solicitation of orders” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 381.83 The
outcome of this case turned on the specific facts. Wrigley had a regional
manager who resided in Wisconsin but did not have a company office
there.84 Instead, the manager held meetings in his basement or a hotel.85
In addition to the manager, Wrigley had sales representatives that were
supplied with company cars, a stock of gum, and display racks to engage
in a number of activities, including replacing old, stale gum and soliciting
additional orders.86 Wrigley did not own or lease property in Wisconsin
and all sales were sent to Chicago for filling.87
Despite having minimal contacts with Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
held that Wrigley’s business activities were beyond those activities
protected by 15 U.S.C. § 381, and Wrigley was subject to Wisconsin’s
net income tax.88 In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

15 U.S.C. § 381.
Id.
505 U.S. 214.
Id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 233
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solicitation of orders covers more than what is strictly essential to making
requests for purchases.89 The solicitation of orders, however, does not
extend to those activities that the company would have reason to engage
in, but designates those responsibilities to the sales force anyway.90
To further define this standard, the Court gave examples of activities
that would be protected under 15 U.S.C. § 381 which included: providing
a car to salespeople, giving stock of free samples of the goods to potential
customers/retailers, regional manager recruitment, and training and
evaluation of employees.91 As examples of non-protected goods, the
Court stated that repair or service to the company’s products, replacing
damaged goods, storage of goods, and replacement of goods would all not
be protected under 15 U.S.C. § 381.92 Non-protected activities would
subject the business to state income tax.
The Court concluded in Wrigley that Wrigley’s business activities were
beyond the scope of 15 U.S.C. § 381 because the sales representatives
replaced its retail customers’ un-sold stale gum, supplied gum through
agency stock checks, and stored the gum in Wisconsin.93 For those
reasons, Wrigley was outside the bounds of 15 U.S.C. § 381 and was,
therefore, subject to Wisconsin’s net income tax.94
In the aftermath of Wrigley, the Multistate Tax Commission (“MTC”)95
set forth a statement of information concerning business practices under
15 U.S.C. § 381.96 Within this statement of information, the MTC set
forth a list of protected and unprotected activities under 15 U.S.C. § 381.97
According to the MTC, protected activities include: soliciting orders for
sales by any type of advertising; passing orders, inquiries and complaints
on to the home office; and providing automobiles to sales personnel for

89. Id. at 228
90. Id. at 228-29. The Court, for example, cites sales representatives repairing or servicing the
company’s products. Replacing goods is not strictly essential for “solicitation of orders” whereas
providing a car would be.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 234-35.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 235.
95. The Multistate Tax Commission is an intergovernmental state tax agency created in 1967 as
an effort by states to protect their tax authority and to help promote fair, uniform, and consistent tax policy.
As of 2019, all 50 states participate in the Multistate Tax Commission in some form. The guidance set
forth by the Commission does not have the force of law, but aids states in developing uniform tax laws.
Member states may opt not to follow the Commission’s recommendations. About Us, MULTISTATE TAX
COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/The-Commission/About-Us [https://perma.cc/F6FC-2SD9].
96. Statement of Information Concerning Practices of Multistate Tax Commission and Signatory
TAX
COMM’N
(2001),
States
under
Public
Law
86-272,
MULTISTATE
http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/Multistate_Tax_Commission/Uniformity/Uniformity_Projects/A__Z/StatementofInfoPublicLaw86-272.pdf [https://perma.cc/F25W-PFXE].
97. Id.
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their use in conducting protected activities.98 By providing this list of
protected and unprotected activities, the MTC provided signatory states
with clarity in determining whether business practices fell within the
protections of 15 U.S.C. § 381 or not, and consequently whether they
could tax the business.99
B. Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
The anti-commandeering rule has been interpreted to mean that the
federal government cannot require a state or state official to adopt or
enforce federal law.100 More specifically, the anti-commandeering
doctrine prohibits Congress from imposing affirmative, coercive duties
upon states.101 This doctrine acts as another constraint on congressional
power, similar to the Bill of Rights.102 Unlike the Bill of Rights, however,
the anti-commandeering principle lacks any textual basis in the
Constitution.103 The Supreme Court created the doctrine out of the Tenth
Amendment and related federalism principles in New York v. United
States,104 Printz v. United States,105 and, most recently, Murphy v.
NCAA.106
1. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States,107 the Supreme Court held that the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (“Waste Act”)
was constitutional in part, and unconstitutional in part.108 In an effort to
combat a radioactive waste disposal problem, Congress passed the Waste
Act which obligated states to provide disposal sites for privately created
waste generated within their borders and included incentives and a taketitle provision to increase compliance with federal standards and to
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Steven D. Schwinn, It’s time to abandon anti-commandeering (but don’t count on this Supreme
Court
to
do
it),
SCOTUSBLOG
(August
17th,
2017,
10:44
AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-commandeering-dont-countsupreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/68ZB-CAGN].
101. Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS OF
A M.
ACAD.
OF
POL.
AND
SOC.
SCI.
158,
158]
(2001),
THE
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/000271620157400112 [https://perma.cc/3RD4-YM2J].
102. Id.
103. Schwinn, supra note 100.
104. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
105. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
106. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
107. New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
108. Id. at 188.
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mitigate the radioactive waste issue.109
Congress provided two-fold incentives—monetary and access—which
the Supreme Court held constitutional.110 The monetary incentives
allowed states with disposal sites to impose a surcharge on radioactive
waste received from other States.111 Additionally, the Waste Act
rewarded states with disposal sites by authorizing them to gradually
increase the cost of access to their waste sites and to deny access to states
that failed to meet federal guidelines.112 These incentives were held
constitutionally permissible due to Congress’ power under the
Commerce, Taxing, and Spending Clauses of the Constitution.113
The Supreme Court, however, invalidated the take-title provision under
the Waste Act as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power.114
The take-title provision specified that a state that failed to provide for the
disposal of all internally generated waste by a particular date must take
title to, and possession of, the waste and become liable for all damages
suffered as a result of the state's failure to promptly take possession.115 In
holding the take-title provision unconstitutional, the Court noted that
“Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’”116 Here, the take-title provision offers state
governments a choice of either accepting ownership of waste or
regulating according to Congress’s instructions.117 Because an instruction
to state governments to take title to waste would be beyond the authority
of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate would also be beyond
the authority of Congress, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacks the
power to offer the States a choice between the two.118
2. Printz v. United States
Similar to New York, in Printz v. United States, the Court held that the
federal government may not compel states to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.119 In Printz, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
109. Id. at 150.
110. Id. at 152-53.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 153.
113. Id. at 188.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 153-54.
116. Id. at 161 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)).
117. Id. at 175.
118. Id. at 176.
119. 521 U.S. at 902.
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Act required the Attorney General to establish a national system for
instantly checking prospective handgun purchasers’ backgrounds and
commanded the “chief law enforcement officer” (“CLEO”) of each local
jurisdiction to conduct such checks and perform related tasks on an
interim basis until the national system became operative.120
The Court concluded that that the Tenth Amendment categorically
forbids the Federal Government from commanding state officials
directly.121 The Government, in support of the constitutionality of the
Brady Handgun Act amendments, attempted to distinguish New York by
arguing that the background check provision does not require state
legislative or executive officials to make policy, ministerial federal tasks
do not diminish the state or federal officials’ accountability, and the Brady
Handgun Act addresses provisions to CLEOs and not the state itself.122
The Court dismissed these arguments by stating that the whole object of
the Brady Handgun Act was to direct the functioning of the state
executive, which would compromise the framework of dual sovereignty,
and thus violated the anti-commandeering principle under the Tenth
Amendment.123
3. Murphy v. NCAA
In 2018, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to review its anticommandeering jurisprudence. This time, however, the applicable statute
did not command the states to take any affirmative action, it merely
forbade a state from taking action.124 In Murphy v. NCAA, New Jersey
challenged a provision under the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (“PAPSA”) that makes it “unlawful” for a state to
“sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or
compact … a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based … on” competitive sporting events.125 In 2014,
despite PAPSA, the New Jersey legislature repealed provisions of an old
state law prohibiting sports gambling.126 The NCAA, among others,
brought suit in the District Court and won on the grounds that the law
violated PASPA by authorizing sports gambling.127 The Third Circuit

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 902-04.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 929-32.
Id. at 935.
28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992).
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1470 (2018).
Id. at 1471.
Id. at 1466.
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affirmed the District Court.128
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the District Court
and Third Circuit.129 The Supreme Court held that the PASPA provision
at issue, the prohibition of state authorization of sports gambling, violated
the anti-commandeering principle.130 The Court highlighted that the anticommandeering principle is simply the expression of a fundamental
structural decision in the Constitution to withhold from Congress the
power to issue orders directly to the states.131 The Court noted the
principle enunciated by Justice O’Connor in New York that “the
Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
states.”132
In Murphy, the Court held that a congressional prohibition of stateauthorized sports gambling “unequivocally dictates what a state
legislature may and may not do.”133 Moreover, “[i]t is as if federal officers
were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the
authority to stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals.”134
The NCAA argued that although Congress cannot compel a state to enact
legislation, Congress can prohibit a state from enacting new laws. The
Court quickly dismissed this argument, stating “[i]t was a matter of
happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz
commanded ‘affirmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition.
The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state
legislatures—applies in either event.”135
The lasting effect of the holding in Murphy will transcend sports
gambling and have a significant impact on various aspects of law,
including state taxing authority. In a recent panel hosted by the American
Bar Association, tax experts predicted a number of challenges to taxing
authority based upon the decision in Murphy.136 The panelists noted three
federal statutes about state taxes that could potentially clash with Murphy:
15 U.S.C. § 381, the Internet Tax Freedom Act,137 and the Mobile

128. Id.
129. Id. at 1473.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1475.
132. Id. at 1477.
133. Id. at 1478.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Maria Koklanaris, Betting Case Looms Large For State Taxation, Specialist Says, LAW360
TAX AUTH. (Jan 18, 2019), LEXIS, 2019 Law360 18-167.
137. See Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 922, 130
Stat. 122 (2016) (codified as 15 U.. The Internet Tax Freedom Act bars all governments from taxing
Internet access.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

15

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 13

952

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

Telecommunications Sourcing Act.138
III. DISCUSSION
The anti-commandeering principle has major implications for
Congress trying to pass legislation limiting the states’ various powers.
Although it has not yet been challenged, states could argue that under the
anti-commandeering doctrine, especially after the expansion in Murphy,
15 U.S.C. § 381 commandeers the states to refrain from taxing businesses
in their state if there is only solicitation of orders, even though the
business may have substantial nexus in the state under Wayfair, MBNA,
and Geoffrey.
This Part advocates for states to challenge the constitutionality of 15
U.S.C. § 381 and proceeds in two parts. First, under the principle stated
in Murphy, 15 U.S.C. § 381 unconstitutionally prohibits states from
imposing a net income tax on out-of-state businesses. Second, a
hypothetical illustrates how ruling that 15 U.S.C. § 381 is unconstitutional
could help states generate more tax revenue by increasing their tax base.
A. 15 U.S.C. § 381 Violates the Tenth Amendment
The anti-commandeering doctrine generally forbids Congress from
commandeering the states’ legislative process and coercing states into
adopting federal regulatory programs. In New York and Printz, the
Supreme Court held that direct coercion from Congress inducing state
governments or officials to take specific action violates the Tenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court explained in both cases that the
Constitution provides Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
states.139 Moreover, the Court noted that there has always been an
understanding that even where Congress has the authority under the
Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.140
Murphy expanded the anti-commandeering doctrine by highlighting
the distinction of whether the federal law regulates individuals or the
state. If a federal law regulates private actors and not the states, the anticommandeering doctrine is not implicated and the law would likely be
held constitutional.141 If the federal law regulates the states, then the anti138. See Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act, Pub. L. No. 106-252, § 116, 114 Stat. 626
(2000). The Mobile Telecommunications Sourcing Act sets uniform nationwide sourcing rules for state
and local taxation of wireless services.
139. New York v. United Stated, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
140. Id.
141. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1489.
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commandeering doctrine is implicated and the law is likely
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.142 In Murphy, the Court
deemed PASPA to be neither a regulation of private actors nor a federal
restriction on private actors and, therefore, held the law unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court found that PASPA “leaves in place a state law that
the state does not want, so the citizens of the state . . . are bound to obey
a law that the state does not want but that the federal government compels
the state to have.”143
15 U.S.C. § 381 is likewise unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine expounded upon by the Supreme Court in New
York, Printz, and Murphy. In relevant part, 15 U.S.C. § 381 restricts a
state from imposing a net income tax on income derived within that state
if the business’ only contacts with the state are through solicitation of
order. In other words, 15 U.S.C. § 381 is a federal regulation that regulates
the states, not individuals, and is therefore arguable a violation of the
Tenth Amendment.
In Murphy, the Court held that a congressional prohibition of state
authorized sports gambling “unequivocally dictates what a state
legislature may and may not do.”144 Similarly, a congressional prohibition
of a state’s taxing authority on a company doing business within a state
unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may not do. The
fundamental principle of the Tenth Amendment is that Congress cannot
issue direct orders to state legislatures, which 15 U.S.C. § 381 does.
Congress puts a direct prohibition on the states regarding their taxing
authority. Moreover, the regulation does not regulate private actors’
conduct, which is the linchpin of whether the anti-commandeering
principle is violated.
One hypothetical challenge proposed at the American Bar Association
tax panel involved Wayfair by asking: if Congress legislated that states
could not impose a sales tax unless retailers had a certain amount of sales
within a state, would it violate Murphy?145 Joe Huddleston, former
executive director of the Multistate Tax Commission, concluded that it
would “[a]bsolutely” violate Murphy.146 As an alternative, an audience
member followed by asking if Congress said that retailers were free from
tax collection from customers unless they had a certain amount of sales
within a state, would it then be constitutional?147 Huddleston again said
142. Id.
143. Oral Argument at 26:18, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1470 (2018) (No. 16-476),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-476.
144. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
145. Koklanaris, supra note 136.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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no, implying that even if the language was aimed at individuals and not
states, the substance of the language would still commandeer the states
into enforcing a federal regulation, thereby violating of the
Constitution.148
The hypothetical situation put forth by the audience member is the
exact issue involved in 15 U.S.C. § 381. Congress steps into the states’
taxing authority, via 15 U.S.C. § 381, and prohibits states from taxing.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 381, it does not matter that a business could do millions
of dollars’ worth of sales within a state, so long as those sales are accepted
and filled outside of the state, that company is not subject to a state’s
income tax. In the modern business world, surely this leads to a distorted
reality.
In 1959, when 15 U.S.C. § 381 was originally enacted, perhaps merely
solicitating orders in a state was unlikely to generate enough revenue to
pose a serious threat to a state’s tax revenue. However, in the 21st century
with the advent of social media and easier access to national sales, 15
U.S.C. § 381 poses a serious threat to state’s tax revenue fund. Businesses
aware of 15 U.S.C. § 381’s far reaching tax exemption are able to avoid
states’ net income taxes by limiting their direct contacts with a state while
still generating sales in the state by filling and shipping advertised sales
from outside the state. This avoidance unduly burdens states faced with
budget crises that need funding for vital state needs, such as educational
funding and infrastructure. For these reasons, states should challenge 15
U.S.C. § 381 on the grounds that it commandeers states into enforcing a
federal regulation, thereby violating the Tenth Amendment.
B. Businesses Would No Longer Be Exempt Without 15 U.S.C. § 381
If a state were to challenge 15 U.S.C. § 381 on constitutional grounds
and succeed, it would still need to show a business satisfies the
constitutional limits on state taxing authority; namely, the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause. A hypothetical set of facts is
illustrative to show how, without the exemption provided by 15 U.S.C. §
381, businesses would be subject to states’ net income tax.
For the purposes of this Article, assume Widgets Co. (“Company”) is
headquartered in State A. Company manufacturers all of its widgets in
State A. In addition to doing business in State A, Company also solicits
orders through sales representatives in State B. Within State B, the sales
representatives advertise and invite orders from customers. The sales
representatives are successful and order forms are filled out for $500,000
worth of widgets annually. These orders are then sent to the home office
148. Id.
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in State A where they are confirmed, filled, and delivered back into State
B from State A through a common carrier such as the U.S. Postal Service.
All activities in State B are currently exempted from tax in State B under
15 U.S.C. § 381 despite having generated approximately $500,000 of net
income in annual sales attributable to State B for Company.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 381, State B is unable to tax any of the $500,000
generated in the state. If, for example, State B has a 10% net income tax,
it is losing $50,000 of tax revenue, assuming there are no applicable
deductions or credits. If State B is in a budget crisis, missing out on
$50,000 in revenue is a big deal. To remedy this, State B should challenge
the constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 381, using to the argument of this
Article, in order to levy its net income tax on Company. Assuming
arguendo that the court accepts the argument and declares 15 U.S.C. §
381 unconstitutional, State B would then need to satisfy the Due Process
Clause and Commerce Clause in order to tax Company.
C. Due Process Clause
In Quill, the Supreme Court held that a business does not need a
physical presence within a state to satisfy nexus under the Due Process
Clause. “Applying these principles, we have held that if a . . . corporation
purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State, it may subject itself to the State's in personam jurisdiction
even if it has no physical presence in the State.”149 Therefore, if a business
allows itself to benefit from the market within a state, the business has
sufficient nexus under the Due Process Clause.
In the hypothetical, Company would have sufficient nexus with State
B to satisfy the Due Process Clause. The Company solicits orders from
citizens of State B, advertises within the state, and has made $500,000
worth of sales attributable to State B. Each of these facts lends itself to
the conclusion that Company has purposefully availed itself to the market
in State B and would therefore satisfy the nexus requirements of the Due
Process Clause.
D. Commerce Clause
In addition to the Due Process Clause, State B also has to show that
taxing the Company does not violate the Commerce Clause. More
specifically, State B has to show that the proposed tax does not
discriminate against interstate commerce. In analyzing whether a state tax
discriminates against interstate commerce, State B must prove the four
149. Quill Corp. v. N.D., 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992).
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elements of the Complete Auto test: (1) the proposed tax is applied to an
activity with substantial nexus with State B; (2) the proposed tax is fairly
apportioned; (3) the proposed tax does not discriminate against out-ofstate commerce; and (4) the proposed tax is fairly related to services
provided by State B. For the purpose of this Article, elements two through
four are assumed, and an analysis is conducted only for element one.
E. Substantial Nexus with the Taxing State
Similar to the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause also asks
whether a business has sufficient nexus with the taxing state. However,
after Quill, the standard for sufficient nexus is different between the Due
Process Clause and Commerce Clause. Furthermore, there is a distinction
in what constitutes sufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause between
income tax and sales tax.
For several years, the Quill physical presence standard was interpreted
as the nexus requirement for both sales and income taxes. However, in
MBNA and Geoffrey, two state courts held that the physical presence
standard applied only for sales tax nexus, and not income tax nexus.150 As
discuss supra, in MBNA, the West Virginia Court believed a significant
economic presence test was a better indicator of nexus for the income tax
than a physical presence standard.151 Thus, under a substantial economic
presence analysis, there is an examination of “the frequency, quantity and
systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state.”152
The Supreme Court followed the income tax trend in the sales tax case
of Wayfair. In Wayfair, the Supreme Court reversed Quill’s longstanding
precedent mandating a physical presence within a state before a sales tax
could be levied on a business. The Court adopted an economic presence
test, upholding South Dakota’s statute levying a sales tax on all businesses
who have earned $100,000 in sales or completed more than 200
transactions in the state.
Thus, although the Supreme Court has not decided what constitutes
nexus for income tax purposes, the trend in both income tax and sales tax
cases supports a conclusion that an economic presence test is the
prevailing measure for whether a state has jurisdiction to tax a business.
Under the standard set forth in MBNA and Geoffrey, it is likely that the
Company would have sufficient nexus to State B under the economic
presence test. The West Virginia court stated that an income tax nexus
requirement inquires into the frequency, quantity, and systematic nature
150. See Tax Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 235 (W. Va. 2006); see also
Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n., 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
151. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d at 234.
152. Id.
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of a taxpayer's economic contacts with a state. With our limited facts,
Company likely satisfies this nexus standard because Company has
$500,000 of sales generated from State B. Although Company generated
a smaller amount of revenue than the bank in MBNA, under the analogous
economic presence standard in the sales tax context, $500,000 in sales
would have been sufficient to trigger the South Dakota sales tax.
Moreover, Company continually and systemically advertises and solicits
orders from within State B. Between the $500,000 of sales and the
systemic solicitation of orders, it is more than likely that the Company
would satisfy the income tax economic presence standard under the
Commerce Clause.
F. Benefit to State B
In conclusion, if a court were to hold 15 U.S.C. § 381 unconstitutional,
State B would be permitted to levy its 10% net income tax on Company’s
sales, generating an additional $50,000 of tax revenue for the state every
tax year. Although trivial in the grand scheme of tax revenue, an
additional $50,000 per year from similar businesses as the Company
could total millions of dollars of extra revenue for State B that could
provide funding for public programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the expanded anti-commandeering doctrine enunciated in
Murphy, states in need of tax revenue should challenge the
constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 381. Under Murphy, congressional
statutes that regulate states and not private actors are unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment. When Congress enforces 15 U.S.C. § 381,
it restricts a state from imposing a net income tax on income derived
within that state if the business’s only contacts with the state are through
solicitation. This enforcement regulates the states, not individuals, and
therefore violates the Tenth Amendment.
After proving 15 U.S.C. § 381 unconstitutional, a state would have to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements under the Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause to impose its income tax on businesses. Often times,
businesses engaged in interstate commerce that are exempted under 15
U.S.C. § 381 would have sufficient contacts with a state to satisfy the
requirements of these two constitutional doctrines. A corporation that
purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in a forum
state would satisfy the necessary requirements of the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, under the Commerce Clause, an inquiry needs to be made into
the “frequency, quantity and systematic nature of a taxpayer's economic
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contacts with a state.”153 Whether a business satisfies this test would
depend on the factual scenario, but if a business generated $500,000
within a state through sales representatives, in-home offices, and
advertisements, that business would likely to be deemed to satisfy the
requirements under the Commerce Clause too.
States hurting for revenues should strongly consider challenging the
constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 381. As seen by the Court’s current trend
of cases, including Wayfair and Murphy, the State could likely see a
windfall return on its investment after challenging the abused Public Law.

153. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss3/13

22

